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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
JEFF KOFOED, 
Petitioner/Applicant 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS and WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Case No. 930201 CA 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code Annotated. 
II. (a) STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(a) Did the Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the 
convict Applicant was not an employee within the meaning of 
Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-43 Utah code Annotated? 
II. (b) STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because these proceedings began after January 1, 1988 the 
Court of Appeals should review this case under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-l et seq.). 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) allows this Court to grant relief if 
the Industrial Commission of Utah has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law. 
This Court has set forth a two level analysis with regard to 
the Standard of Review used in determining the question of whether 
or not an agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law. King 
IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT GRANT OF AUTHORITY? 
Under King the first enquiry is whether the legislature of 
Utah gave the Industrial Commission an explicit grant of discretion 
to interpret Sections 43 and 45. If not, the Court should 
determine whether an implicit grant of discretion was made to the 
agency. 
With respect to Section 45 this Court has repeatedly held that 
there is neither an explicit or implicit grant of discretion to 
interpret Section 45. (See King at 1292, Cross v. Board of Review, 
824 P2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992) and Stokes v. Board of Review, 
832 P2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992). 
As far as this Petitioner has been able to ascertain, no Utah 
Appellate court has determined specifically whether the legislature 
has given a grant of discretion to the Industrial Commission to 
interpret Section 43. However, to the extent that the legislature 
used Section 43 to define the terminology used in Section 45, it 
appears that an identical analysis would apply and that no grant of 
discretion had been given with respect to Section 43. 
Therefore, this Court should review the legal interpretation 
of the Industrial Commission using a correction of error standard 
which affords no deference to the legal conclusions of the 
Industrial Commission. 
2 
Ill, DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Petitioner hereby asserts the below listed statutes, the 
full texts of which are appended hereto, and are determinative of 
the issue reaied by the Petition for Review. 
a. 35-1-42 (1986 version attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1). 
b. 35-1-43 (1986 version attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1). 
c. 35-1-45 (1986 version attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Course of Proceedings below: 
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission of Utah's 
reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's determination that the 
Petitioner was entitled to Workers Compensation Benefits for the 
injuries he received while serving his prison sentence as a convict 
fire fighter. The ALJ determined Petitioner was an employee. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah reversed, holding that Petitioner was 
not an employee. This Petition for Review ensued. 
b. Statement of Pacts:2 
1. The applicant herein, Jeff Kofoed, is and was an inmate 
of the Utah State Prison. In October of 1985, the applicant 
entered the Utah State Prison for a credit card violation. On or 
about July 20, 1986, he became a fire fighter at the Utah State 
Prison. The applicant was allowed to volunteer and as an inmate 
Petitioner was released from prison approximately September 
7, 1993. 
'Taken verbatim from the Administrative Law Judge's Findings 
of Fact through page 4 (except for the last paragraph). 
Additionally, the paragraphs have now been numbered. (R. 00068 
through R. 00071). 
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sign up for the Conservation Camp at the Utah State Prison based on 
his conduct. The purpose of the Conservation Camp was to perform 
conservation and fire suppression activities both in the state of 
Utah and throughout the West. The program which the applicant was 
involved in, was a joint program between the Department of 
Corrections and the Division of State Lands and Forestry, according 
to the testimony of the deputy warden. That program, consists of 
the Lone Peak State Nursery and the Conservation Camp, which are 
located at the prison. The Conservation Camp program was not 
housed with the regular prison population, but rather, was housed 
at the Lone Peak facility. 
2. As part of the Conservation Camp Resident's Agreement, 
the applicant agreed that he would remain in the program for a 
minimum of one year. The Agreement also noted that the applicant's 
"Participation in the Conservation Camp is purely voluntary." In 
addition, that Agreement required that applicant satisfactorily 
complete the "Fire Fighting training program and Advanced First Aid 
by the American Red Cross, and other training as needed or 
assigned." As a result, the applicant received his training, and 
fought approximately 30 fires during the summer of 1986. In late 
August of 1986, the applicant had been fighting fires in Oregon, 
when he was assigned to a fire in Idaho. 
3. On August 25, 1986, the applicant was traveling in a van 
to the scene of a fire on public land in Idaho. As he was 
traveling in the van, the van went off a cliff. The applicant 
sustained injuries to his low back. He was treated in Boise, and 
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received a low back x-ray and was informed that he had sustained a 
really bad bruise. The applicant was given pain medication, and 
was hospitalized for three days. He was then returned to the Utah 
State Prison. 
4. The applicant had intermittent sharp stabbing pains which 
he reported to the Conservation Camp supervisor, Lieutenant 
Johnstun. The applicant had pain killing drugs prescribed for his 
condition, but pursuant to prison rules, he was unable to receive 
that medication. Instead, the applicant was given aspirin and 
antiflammatory medication. The applicant testified that his low 
back pain gradually worsened over the years. Between 1987 and 
1990, the applicant was paroled a total of approximately 18 months. 
The applicant denied any low back injuries while on parole. 
5. In December of 1988, the applicant was in a racial fight 
at the prison, and was struck on the cheek with a 2fx4f(sic.) 
board. The applicant was rendered unconscious, and testified that 
he thought that he had fractured his cheek. The applicant 
testified that his back hurt but that he received no treatment for 
it. 
6. In January of 1990, the applicant returned to the fire 
fighting program and stayed in that program until November of 1990. 
The applicant testified that his job at that time was to drive one 
of the vans. While so engaged, the applicant noticed that his 
right leg was going numb. He reported his problem to the staff, 
but they concluded that the applicant was trying to get out of work 
on the first three occasions that he complained. Finally, a 
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medical assistant examined the applicant and informed him that 
maybe he had an inflamed low back muscle. The applicant was 
paroled in November of 1990. 
7. In January of 1991, the applicant started having 
increasing low back pain, which was increasing in both frequency 
and severity. The applicant thought that it was sore muscles, and 
testified that he had sustained no trauma during that time to his 
low back. While he was admitted to the Project Reality Program, 
the applicant complained of low back pain to the people there. In 
March or April of 1991, the applicant went to St. Mark's Emergency 
Room, and was told at that facility hat he would need a CT scan of 
his low back. However, the applicant did not have the $800 cost 
and so he did not receive that diagnostic study. On May 6, 1991, 
the applicant reported to Dr. Hagen, for chiropractic evaluation. 
Dr. Hagen diagnosed an inflamed nerve in the applicant's back. In 
June of 1991, the applicant was returned to the Utah State Prison 
because of a revoked parole. 
8. This applicant continued complaining of low back pain, a 
note in the prison medical records indicates that the applicant on 
August 22, 1991, had a request to work in the kitchen "Disapproved 
due to chronic low back pain.ff As indicated, the applicant kept 
complaining of low back pain, and would see the medical technician, 
whom he described as a ffpill pusher", who would tell the applicant 
that he would give the doctor the applicant's notes requesting a 
visit with the doctor. The applicant noticed a pain down his right 
leg, and he kept filling out requests to see the doctor. Finally, 
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the physician's assistant came out and .gave the applicant an exam 
and gave him Naprosyn, and informed him that if his conditions 
worsened, he should let the physician's assistant know. The 
applicant's condition did worsen, and on September, 23, 1991, he 
was given a three day "lay-in" to see the doctor. Unfortunately, 
the doctor never appeared. After four days, the applicant returned 
to his teacher's assistant duties at the prison. On September 27, 
1991, the doctor did see the applicant, and informed him that he 
could not do anything for the applicant but give him medication. 
The applicant filed a grievance with the prison for the purpose of 
seeing a doctor and getting definitive medical treatment. In 
October of 1991, the applicant went to the doctor and the doctor 
recommended that the applicant have a CT scan. That CT scan was 
performed on November 8, 1991. That scan indicated that the 
applicant had herniated discs at L3-4 and L5-S1. On January 3, 
1992, sometime after the CT scan of November 8, 1991, the applicant 
was told by prison staff that his low back problem was genetic. 
The applicant filed a grievance regarding his inability to get fair 
medical treatment. The applicant was informed by the prison that 
he was getting fair treatment. 
9. In January of 1992, the applicant was informed that he 
was to see Dr. Reichman. The applicant did see Dr. Reichman on 
January 13, 1992, and Dr. Reichman informed the applicant that he 
had herniated discs, and that they were not the result of any 
genetic condition. He also informed the applicant that he would 
need surgery, and would schedule the same for March 4, 1992. 
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However, the applicant was never informed of the surgical date, 
instead someone from the Utah State Prison called the doctor's 
office and canceled the surgery. Shortly thereafter, the applicant 
was paroled on March 10, 1992. 
10. On April 8, 1992, the applicant had low back surgery 
performed by Dr. Reichman. Dr. Reichman performed microndiscectomy 
surgery at L5-S1. The applicant apparently had an uneventful 
recovery from his surgery. 
11. In June of 1992, the applicant was returned to Utah State 
Prison for failing the drug screening test. 
12. The Deputy Warden testified that the Division of State 
Lands and Forestry invoices the Fire Fighting inmates services at 
$6.00 - $6.50 per hour. He testified that the Utah State Prison, 
however, only received the cost of the inmate wage of $3.50 per 
hour, and the Division of State Lands and Forestry pockets the 
remainder. The Division of State Lands and Forestry also provides 
the equipment that the inmates need in addition to the wage. The 
prison's Director of Support Services testified that there is no 
withholding from the funds paid to the prisoners, because the 
prison has concluded that those payments are a "Stipend", and are 
not "Wages" since the prison had no intent to pay wages. However, 
Mr. Latham did indicate that the prison does pay workers 
compensation premiums on some of its Utah Correctional Industries 
employees, because of Federal law requirements. 
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V, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner was in fact an employee at the time of his 
injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER WAS AN EMPLOYEE AT 
THE TIME OF THE INJURY 
On October 25, 1986 Section 35-1-45 of the Workers 
Compensation Act read in relevant part as follows: 
"Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-
45 who is injured. . . by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment . . . 
shall be paid compensation . . .". 
A review of Section 43 to determine if Petitioner was a 
"employee mentioned" reveals the following language: 
1. ". . . employee" means . . . (b) 
each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the 
same business, or in or about the same 
establishment, under any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written, including 
aliens and minors, whether legally or 
illegally working for hire, but not including 
any person whose employment is casual and not 
in the usual course of the trade, business or 
occupation of his employer." 
The crucial language of Section 43 appears to require a four 
step analysis to determine if someone is an employee. This 
analysis is as follows: 
1. Is the claimant in the service of; 
JThe conjunctive arising "out of and in the course" of 
employment language appeared in the statute effective July 1, 1988. 
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2. An employer as defined in Section 42; 
3. Which employer regularly employs one or more operatives; 
4. But not including any person whose employment is: 
a. casual; and 
b. not in the usual course of the trade, business or 
occupation of his employer. 
First, it is clear that the petitioner was rendering a service 
while fighting fires. The Department of Corrections had lent the 
employee to the State Division of Lands and Forestry, which in turn 
lent Petitioner to the Forest Service. It is beyond dispute that 
the Petitioner was paid the sum of $3.50 per hour for his services. 
See Yount v. Boundary County, 7 96 P.2d 516 (Id. 1990) for a 
discussion from the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the issue of when 
a non-traditional employee (in this case.a citizen serving on jury 
duty) is "in the service" of a governmental entity. See also Clark 
Co. v. State of Nevada, Industrial Comm. , 669 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1983) 
for a case which held election clerks (who only work on election 
days) to be employees. 
Second, a glance at Section 42 shows that: "The state, and 
each county, . . . are considered employers under this title." 
Third, it is beyond dispute that the State of Utah employs 
more than one employee or operative in the conduct of its affairs. 
Finally, casual refers to activities that are not in 
furtherance of the employer's usual activities. Summerville v. 
Industrial Commission, 196 P.2d 718 (1948) and Sorenson v. 
Industrial Commission, 598 P.2d 362 (Ut. 1972). Additionally, the 
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activities of fire fighting are part and parcel of what the State 
of Utah does. Therefore, it would be impossible for the work done 
by the applicant to be casual employment. 
As noted by Professor Larsen in his treatise Larsenys 
Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 47.31, convicts have usually 
been denied compensation for work done while in prison based upon 
the lack of a contract of employment. However, Professor Larsen 
states at Section 47.31(d): "There has been a greater inclination 
to find employee status for prisoners when, instead of merely 
working within the prison, they have been lent to other state 
agencies or even private employers" (note omitted). 
The record herein shows that Petitioner was paid $3.50 an 
hour, that he was lent to the State Division of Lands and Forestry, 
and that the State Division of Lands and Forestry then entered into 
an arrangement whereby the Petitioner would render service to the 
Forest Service. 
Board of Education of Alpine v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 
1984) the Utah Supreme Court found a school shop class volunteer 
not to be an employee because the claimant received no compensation 
and the employer had no control over work hours or any other aspect 
of work. However, the instant petition involves facts far 
different than those present in Olsen. First, Petitioner was paid 
$3.50 per hour. Additionally, the state controlled every aspect of 
Petitioner's life, even going so far as to dispatch Petitioner to 
the far corners of the Western United States. 
For nearly 45 years the key test of whether one is an employee 
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is the issue of control. Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
195 P.2d 245 (1948). Respondents would be hard pressed to dispute 
the assertion that Petitioner was totally under the direction and 
control of the State of Utah and its agents at all times relevant 
herein. For further authority for the proposition that the right 
to control the details of the work is the determining factor with 
regard the employee status see Bennett v. Industrial Comm., 726 
P.2d 427 (Ut. 1986) and Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm., 562 P.2d 
227 (Ut. 1977). 
POINT II. 
PRISONERS WERE NOT MADE NON EMPLOYEES 
UNTIL 1993 
In 1993 the Utah Legislature passed major amendments to the 
Workers Compensation Act with regard to the status of convict 
labor. Attached hereto as Exhibit No. 2 find the portions of the 
Workers Compensation Act which were amended in 1993. 
The conduct of the legislature in passing new laws with regard 
to convict labor and workers compensation coverage is persuasive 
evidence that prisoners could in fact be employees prior to 1993. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner meets all the statutory and case law criteria 
which must be satisfied in order to qualify as an employee. 
Furthermore, the legislature did not deny Workers Compensation to 
inmates until 1993. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for an Order reversing the legal 
conclusion made by the Industrial Commission and for an Order 
remanding this matter for further proceedings pursuant to the Order 
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of the Administrative Law Judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ' day of September, 1993 
lM,^fl^iSv_ 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed/hand delivered a copy of the foregoing to: 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Sharon J. Eblen 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
P. O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
P. O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Ralph Adams 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Department of Corrections 
6100 South Fashion Place Blvd. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
on this day of September, 1993, 
A. (JUMHL, 
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ADDENDUM 
Attachment No, 1 
Section 35-1-42 (1986 version) 
Section 35-1-43 (1986 version) 
Section 35-1-45 (1986 version) 
Ui tin V.V/&SC 
1*6*1937 Labor - mausinai tommisMun ff—JL -wmmm 
alteration, modification, amendment or rescission of 
the commission's order, and shall thereafter proceed 
with the action in the manner provided by law for 
other civil actions. 1953 
35-1-36* Actions to set aside orders - Exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, district courts, 
snd the Court of Appeals. 
No court, except the district court. Court of 
Appeals, and the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to 
review, vacate, set aside, reverse, revisfe, correct, 
amend, or annul any order of the commission req-
uiring protection of life, health, safety, or welfare 
of employees in any* employment or places of emp-
loyment* or to suspend or delay the execution or 
operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere 
with the commission in the performance of its offi-
cial duties, m t 
35-1-37. Stay of proceedings - Supersedeas 
The pendency of an action to set aside, vacate or 
amend an order of the commission shall not of itself; 
stay the operation of an order of the commission; 
but during the pendency of the action the district 
court in its discretion may stay, in whole or in part, 
the operation of the commission's order* No order 
so staying or suspending an order of the commission 
shall be made by the court otherwise than upon 
three days' notice and after a hearing. In case the 
order is stayed, the order of the court shall not 
become effective until a supersedeas bond shall have 
been executed and filed in the action and approved 
by the court or the cleric thereof, payable to the 
state of Utah and sufficient in amount and security 
to ensure the prompt payment by the party compl-
aining o f all damages caused by the delay in the 
enforcement of the order of the commission. 19S3 
35-1-3$. Proceedings preferred on trial calendars. 
All actions and proceedings under this title, and 
all actions or proceedings to which the commission 
or the' state may be a party, in which any question 
arises under this title, or under or concerning any 
order of the commission, shall be advanced for trial 
or hearing over all other civil causes, except election 
and public utility causes, irrespective of position on 
the calendar. The same preference shall be granted 
upon application of the commission in any action or 
proceeding in which it may be allowed to intervene. 
» 19S3 
35-1-39. Violation of Judgments, orders, decrees 
or provisions of act - Grade of offense. 
* If any employer, employee or other person viol-
ates any provision of this title, or does any act 
prohibited hereby, or fails or refuses to perform any 
duty lawfully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses 
to obey any lawful order given or made by the 
commission, or any judgment or decree made by 
any court in connection with the provisions of this 
title! such employer, employee or other person shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. 1953 
35-1-40. Each day's default a separate offense. 
Every day } during which any person or corpora-
tion fails to observe and comply with any order of 
the commission, or to perform any duty imposed by 
this title shall ..constitute a separate and distinct 
offense. 1953 
35-1-41. Furnishing information to commission 
• Employers' annual report - Rights of 
commission - Examination of employers under 
A«#h _ D*nal fUc 
of each year every employer shall prepare and mail 
to the commission a statement containing the foil-, 
owing information* vizi The number of persons 
employed during the preceding year from July 1, to , 
June 30, inclusive; the number of such persons 
employed at each kind of employment; the scale of 
wages paid in each class of employment, showing4 
the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the* 
aggregate amount of wages paid to all employees; 
which information shall be furnished on blanks to 
be prepared by the commission and furnished emp-
loyers free of charge upon request therefore Every, 
employer shall cause such blanks to be properly 
fllled out so as to answer fully and correctly alls 
questions therein propounded, and shall give all the 
information therein sought, or, if unable to do so , , 
he shall give to the commission, in writing, good 
and sufficient reasons for such failure. The comm-
ission may require the information herein required 
to be furnished to be made under oath and returned, 
to the commission within the period fixed by it or 
by law. The commission, or any member thereof, or 
any person employed by the commission for that 
purpose, shall have the right to examine, under* 
oath /any employer; his agents or employees, for the, 
purpose o f ascertaining any information which such 
employer is required by this title to furnish to the 
commission. Any employer who, within a reason-
able time to be fixed by the commission and after 
the receipt of written notice signed by at least two 
members of the commission specifying the inform-
ation demanded and served by registered mail, 
refuses to furnish to the commission the annual 
statement herein required, or who refuses to furnish 
such other information as may be required by the 
commission under authority of this section, or who 
willfully furnishes a false or untrue statement shall 
be liable to a penalty of not to exceed $500 for each 
offense to be recovered in a civil action brought by 
and in the name of the commission. All such pena-
lties when collected shall be paid into the combined 
injury benefit fund. 1977 
35-1-42* Employers enumerated and defined • 
Regularly employed - Independent contractors. 
The following constitute employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and 
school district in the state. 
(2)(a) Every person, firm, and corporation, incl-
uding every public utility, having in service one or 
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in 
the same business, or in or about the same establi-
shment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, except: 
(i) agricultural-employers : (A) whose empl-
oyees are all members of the immediate family of 
the employer, which employer has a proprietary 
interest in the farm, the inclusion of any immediate 
family member under the provisions of this title 
being at the option of the employer; or (B) who 
employ five or fewer persons other than immediate 
family members for 40 hours or more per week per 
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part 
of the preceding 12 months; and 
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ 
one employee or more than one employee at least 40 
hours per week. 
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and 
doniMtic servants have the right to come under the 
w fv^uioiiy inciuaes an employments in the 
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or 
occupation*of'the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the 
year. 
* (b) Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and'this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and 
all persons employed by any of these subcontrac-
tors, are considered employees of the original emp-
loyer 
(c) Any person,'firm, or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent contr-
actor is considered an employer. 
(d)1 "Independent contractor47 ' means any 
person, association, or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
td the rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in, accordance with the employer's 
design. m* 
35*1-43. "Employee/ "workmen/ and 
"operative" defined - Mining lessees and 
sublessees - Partners and sole proprietors -
Real estate agent or broker. 
(1) The words "employee/ "workmen/ and 
"Operative/ as used in this chapter, mean: 
(a) every elective and appointive officer, and 
every other person, in the service of the state, or of 
any county, city, town, or school district within the 
state, serving the state, or any county* city, town, or 
school district under any election or appointment, or 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
written or oral, including all officers and employees 
of the state institutions of learning; and 
(b) every person in the service of any employer 
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one 
or more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral 
or' Written, including aliens, and minors whether 
legally or illegally working for hire, but not inclu-
ding any person whose employment is casual and 
not in the usual course of trade, business, or occu-
pation of his employer. 
(2) All lessees in mines or of mining property and 
the employees and sublessees of these lessees shall, 
unless the lessee provides coverage as an employer 
under this chapter, be covered for compensation by 
the lessor under this chapter, and shall, in such 
event, be subject to this chapter and entitled to its 
benefits to the same extent as if they were employees 
of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid empl-
oyees for similar or substantially similar work. The 
lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores mined 
by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance 
premium for such type of work. 
^ (3) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect 
to include as an employee under this chapter any 
member of the partnership or the owner of the sole 
proprietorship. If this election occurs, the employer 
shall serve upon the employer's insurance carrier 
and upon the commission written notice naming the 
partners to be covered. No partner is considered an 
, carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the emp-
loyee to be 130% of the state's average weekly 
wage. 
(4) As used in this chapter, the words "employee/ 
"workman," and "operative" do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in 
Section 61-2-2, who performs services as such for 
a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or 
associated broker's income for services is from real 
estate commissions;' 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or ass-
ociated broker are performed under a written cont-
ract specifying that the real estate agent is an inde-
pendent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate agent 
or associated broker is not to be treated as an 
employee for federal income tax purposes. if* 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Order" shall mean and include any deci-
sion, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or 
standard of the commission, or any other determi-
nation arrived at, or decision made, by such com-
mission. 
(2) "General order" shall mean and include an 
j order applying generally throughout the state to all 
i persons, employments or places of employment of a 
class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All 
other orders of the commission shall be considered 
special orders. 
(3) "Welfare" shall mean and include comfort, 
decency and moral well-being. 
(4) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any 
employment or place of employment, shall mean 
such freedom from danger to the life, health or 
L welfare of employees as the nature of the employ-
ment will reasonably permit. 
(5) "Personal injury by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment" shall include any 
injury caused by the willful act of a third person 
directed against an employee because of his emplo-
yment. It shall not include a disease, except as it 
shall result from the injury. 
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments 
and benefits provided for in this title. 
' (7) "Award" shall mean the finding or decision 
of the commission as to the amount of compensa-
tion due any injured, or the dependents of any 
deceased, employee. 
(8) "Average weekly earnings" shall mean the 
average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in section 35-1-75. tm 
I 35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to 
be paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 
who is injured, and the dependents of every such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or 
I in the course of his employment, wherever such 
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for lost 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and 
I such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital serv-
I ices and medicines, and, in case of death, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the emolover and it* incur. 
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(b) A general contractor may not be considered to 
have retained supervision or control over the work 
of a subcontractor solely because of the customary 
trade relationship between general contractors and 
subcontractors. 
(c) A portion of a construction project 
subcontracted to others may be considered to be a 
part or process in the trade or business of the 
general building contractor, only if the general 
building contractor, without regard to whether or 
not it would need additional employees, would 
perform the work in the normal course of its trade 
or business. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, 
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence that 
he owns or is in the process of acquiring as his 
personal residence may not be considered an 
employee or employer solely by operation of 
Subsection (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship may not be considered an 
employee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-1-43 (3)(a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee under 
Subsection 35-1-43 (3)(a), but his employer fails 
to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of 
direct compensation, which failure is attributable to 
an act or omission over which the person had or 
shared control or responsibility. 
(0 For purposes of Subsection (e)(ii): 
(i) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a 
sole proprietorship are presumed to have had or 
shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of 
direct compensation, the burden of proof being on 
any person seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing that a 
partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship had or shared control or 
responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise 
provide adequate payment of direct compensation 
may only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may not 
be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if 
the director or officer is excluded from coverage 
under Subsection 35-1-43 (3)(b). 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 109, Laws of Utah 
1988, is amended to read: 
35-1-43. "Employee/ "worker" or " 
workmen/ and "operative" defined- Mining 
lessees and sublessees- Partners and sole 
proprietors- Corporate officers and directors-
Real estate agents and brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," 
"worker" or "workmen," and "operative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any 
other person, in the service of the state, or of any 
county, city, town, or school district within the 
state, serving the state, or any county, city, town, or 
school district under any election or appointment, or 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
written or oral, including each officer and employee 
of the state institutions of learning; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral 
or written, including aliens and minors, whether 
legally or illegally working for hire, but not 
including any person whose employment is casual 
and not in the usual course of the trade, business, 
or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an 
employer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or 
of mining property and each employee and sublessee 
of the lessee shall be covered for compensation by 
the lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to 
this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same 
extent as if they were employees of the lessor 
drawing such wages as are paid employees for 
substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct 
from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an 
amount equal to the insurance premium for that 
type of work. 
(3)(a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chapter 
any partner of the partnership or the owner of the 
sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the commission naming the persons to be covered. 
No partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
proprietorship is considered an employee under this 
chapter until this notice has been given. For 
premium rate making, the insurance carrier shall 
assume the salary or wage of the employee to be 
150% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an 
employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier and upon the commission naming 
the persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is considered an 
employee under this chapter until this notice has 
been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," 
"worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not 
include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as 
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services 
in that capacity for a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or 
associated broker's income for services is from real 
estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or 
associated broker are performed under a written 
contract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate agent or 
associated broker is not to be treated as an 
employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," 
"worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not 
include an offender performing labor under Section 
64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by 
federal statute or regulation. 
Section 3. Section Amended. 
Section 64-13-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 
1987, is amended to read: 
64-13-16. Inmate employment. 
(1) Unless incapable of employment because of 
sickness or other infirmity or for security reasons, 
the department may employ inmates to the degree 
that funding and available resources allow. An 
~ . ^ mi employee, worker, workman, or 
operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, 
Workers' Compensation, except as required by 
federal statute or regulation. 
Section 4. Section Amended. 
Section 64-13-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 
1987, is amended to read: 
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
(1) The department shall determine the types of 
labor to be pursued, and what kind, quality, and 
quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be 
produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional 
facilities. Contracts may be made for the labor of 
offenders, including contracts with any federal 
agency for a project affecting national defense. As 
many offenders as practicable may be employed to 
produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, 
materials, or supplies for sale to the state or its 
political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the 
department. 
(2) An offender performing labor under this 
section is not considered an employee, worker, 
workman, or operative for purposes of Title 35, 
Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, except as 
required by federal statute or regulation. 
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Laws of Utah 1993, Chapter 44 
Rural Medical Financial Assistance 
By Christine R. Fox 
An Act relating to health; creating a grant and 
scholarship program for rural physician 
assistants, and consolidating the existing 
rural physician grant and scholarship 
program with the rural physician assistants 
program; provid ing procedures for 
qualifications, service, and enforcement; 
and providing an effective date. 
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 26-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 252, Laws of Utah 1992, is 
amended to read: 
